


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# SPECIAL REPORT

CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

MORI/CDF Pages 1-15

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**CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA**

The Castro regime continues to regard the promotion of Communist-led revolution in Latin America as one of its principal goals. Fidel Castro's 26 July address was the most militant public expressions of this policy to come out of Cuba in many months. He declared that conditions in many Latin American countries now are more propitious for the initiation of revolutionary action than they were in Cuba ten years ago when he began his revolutionary struggle. He said that what has happened in Cuba can happen "exactly the same" in many other Latin American countries and exhorted revolutionaries there to "open the breach" and begin fighting.

Castro repeatedly declared that Cuba does not "export" revolution. If by this he means that Cuba does not send Cuban weapons and Cuban military units to other countries, there is no evidence to refute him. However, he and other Cuban leaders openly declaim that they regard their country as the main source of guidance and inspiration for what they call the "inevitable" Latin American revolution. The Cuban subversive effort is being carried on in a number of ways, principally through the indoctrination and training in Cuba of hundreds of Latin Americans who return home to pass on what they have learned, and through the provision of practical guidance, monetary aid, and open propaganda support to revolutionary leaders and groups.


**The World Context**

Between March and Castro's 26 July address, the surface manifestations of the Cuban subversive effort in Latin America appeared much more restrained than during the several months before. This period of relative restraint coincided with the period of repair in Cuban-Soviet relations that followed the shock of last fall's missile crisis. It might also be significant that the resumption

of the more militant Cuban line did not take place until after the breakdown in the Sino-Soviet discussions in July.

One result of Castro's trip to the USSR this spring may have been, at least for the time being, to bring Moscow and Havana closer to partnership, rather than rivalry, in the Communist effort in Latin America. Castro stated specifically in his 26 July address that "we know by experience and conviction

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that all people who do what the Cuban people have done will have the decided support of the Soviet Union and of all the socialist camp.

The whole subject of Communist goals and tactics in Latin America was almost certainly a subject of discussion during Castro's visit. The joint Cuban-Soviet communiqué suggests agreement on the point that conditions in certain Latin American countries offer more hope of Communist victory through peaceful means than through violence. There had been indications before the Moscow trip that the USSR was concerned about Cuban support for dissident Communist or non-Communist revolutionary groups in certain countries, notably Brazil, over the opposition of orthodox Communists whose strategy was to attempt to influence and eventually to dominate the government rather than to overthrow it.

Several Latin American Communist leaders may have participated in the discussions between Castro and Soviet leaders. Three prominent South American Communists were in the USSR at the time of Castro's visit, and at least two of them met with him there.

The lavish treatment Castro received during his Soviet trip undoubtedly raised his prestige among old-line Latin American Communists by indicating to them that Moscow had accepted Castro's leadership of the first Communist regime in the western hem-

isphere. Uruguay's Communist leader Rodney Arismendi, long regarded as Moscow-oriented, had the following to say during a Communist gathering in Montevideo in late June, shortly after his return from the USSR where he had met Castro: "We are an echo of the continental revolutionary movement which is bursting forth, fighting against imperialism, with its eyes on the victorious struggle of the Cuban revolution. We are a single force, the force of anti-imperialism in Latin America, whose heart beats in the Cuba of Fidel Castro."

#### Latin American Trainees in Cuba

An estimated 1,000 to 1,500 Latin Americans received training in Cuba last year. The trainees are subsequently returned to their homelands, many via circuitous routes through Europe, to put into practice what they have learned and to recruit additional personnel. In recent months, for instance, Cuba-trained subversives have set up guerrilla training camps in Costa Rica, Honduras, and Panama.

Among the more than 300 Latin Americans who traveled to Cuba in recent weeks under the guise of visitors to the 26 July celebrations, many are expected to remain for some months. These will probably join others already there and receive ideological indoctrination and training in the practical arts of subversion.

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Reports on last year's training programs in Cuba provide considerable detail on the types of training received. The training programs, varying in length from several weeks to six months, included instruction on virtually all aspects of guerrilla warfare, as well as heavy doses of ideological indoctrination. A report from a recently returned [redacted]

disillusioned after spending several months in Cuba, suggests that many Latin Americans go to Cuba in the expectation of receiving a useful education but are then embroiled in ideological and paramilitary training.

Other Cuban Support

Reports from some of the trainees reveal that groups from certain Latin American countries have received specific advice on what they are to do on their return and whom they are to cultivate. [redacted]

[redacted] claims to have been asked directly by Che Guevara to prepare a detailed report on Colombia covering the political situation, labor, student and peasant affairs, social and economic conditions, as well as the extent and estimated effectiveness of the guerrilla bands operating in his country. The purpose of the report was to assist the Cubans in developing "future plans for Colombia." Similar reports have come from sources of other nationalities.

A number of reports indicate that Cuba continues to provide financial assistance to various subversive groups in Latin America. There is still no convincing evidence, however, of Cuba's supplying military equipment directly to these groups. In most of the countries concerned, military equipment can be obtained through illicit channels, or is captured during attacks on military and police posts.

Cuban Propaganda

Cuban radiobroadcasts, although less inflammatory than during the October to March period, still perform a direct service to Communist and pro-Communist actions and statements. The Cuban radio, for instance, is the primary means by which the Venezuelan Communists' Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) obtains publicity in Venezuela. This publicity carries a considerable psychological impact, since a relatively small group like the FALN measures the degree of its success to a large extent on its ability to create the impression of much greater strength than it actually possesses. Similarly, the publicity received through Cuban media has been one of the main assets of the small guerrilla groups which have operated sporadically in Guatemala.

Travel Between Cuba and Latin America

Cuba has been faced in recent months with a growing problem

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in keeping open means of travel between Havana and the rest of Latin America. The increasingly tight controls being imposed by the Mexican Government on travelers who pass through that country en route to and from Cuba has been an important case in point. Cuba's response has been to route an increasingly large proportion of clandestine trainees via the much longer and more expensive commercial links through Europe.

There have also been successful Cuban efforts to return a few visitors to Cuba by way of Grand Cayman Island and other western hemisphere airfields. Also, 24 South Americans who had visited Cuba for May Day went home on a special CUBANA flight, the only stated purpose of which was to take the new Cuban ambassador to his post in Brazil. On its return trip, this special flight carried three of the Venezuelans who had participated in the seizure of the SS Anzoategui early this year.

Overt Operations

Cuba is also seeking--not too successfully so far--to further its goals in Latin America by various overt means, such as participation in a number of international conferences. The "Congress of Solidarity with Cuba" held at Niteroi, Brazil, in March, was a failure as a propaganda effort. The Student Seminar on the Underdeveloped World, held in Bahia, Brazil, in July, also appears to have been unsuccessful. Preparatory meetings with Chilean, Bolivian, and other Latin American labor leaders in an effort to sponsor the formation of a new inter-American labor organization to replace the CTAL as the Communist trade union vehicle in Latin America have not yet produced any concrete results. The Second Latin American Youth Congress, which was to have been held in Chile next month, had to be postponed after the organizers became increasingly aware of the difficulties likely to be encountered in that country.

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A country-by-country rundown of the Cuban subversive effort in Latin America suggests strongly that the total Cuban effort has not diminished during the past six months. In some countries, notably Brazil and Chile, where Havana may have come to agree with Moscow that peaceful methods offer more hope of a Communist victory than does violence, Cuba is showing restraint. In others, such as Venezuela, Peru, and Colombia, the Cuban effort appears to be continuing as before.

Argentina

Since early 1963, there have been a number of indications of a Cuban effort to win the cooperation of former Argentine dictator Peron and his followers. There is no evidence that Peron himself has made any commitment to the Cubans, although he reportedly has just appointed a Cuban agent as his representative in charge of the revolutionary wing of the Peronist movement. Such extreme left-wing Peronists as John William Cooke and Americo Barrios are also reportedly cooperating fully with Cuban agents in their efforts to influence the Peronist movement.

In the meantime, Cuban propaganda media gave strong support to the Peronist effort to sabotage the 7 July national elections in Argentina. Also, three of Castro's top aides who accompanied him to Moscow contacted associates of Peron in Spain while Castro was still in the USSR.

Despite the deep splits within the Peronist movement,

revealed by the recent elections, extremist Peronist leaders still threaten revolutionary activity. Cuban-Peronist revolutionary activities may also find new help from the Argentine Communist Party (PCA). This may result from Moscow's recent criticism of PCA leader Codovilla--made partly at Castro's behest--for his lukewarm leadership.

The working headquarters for the Cuban subversive effort against Argentina is located in Montevideo, Uruguay, where the Cuban Embassy gives support to a small group of Argentine terrorists and Peronist revolutionaries. The Cuban Embassy in Montevideo has been instrumental in recruiting and providing travel arrangements for Argentines sent to Cuba for training. At least 28 Argentines traveled to Cuba for the 26 July celebration, and some may remain for training.

The preparation of military training areas in Bolivia and Paraguay for Argentine subversives has also been reported.

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**SECRET**Bolivia

Evidence that Cuba regards Bolivia as a staging area from which to send trained subversives into neighboring countries was reinforced since late May by the arrest of a number of Peruvian subversives, some of whom had received training in Cuba. These Cuba-trained subversives apparently enter Bolivia from Brazil for an onward journey to Peru through the dense, unpatrolled jungle regions. Also, two Peruvians having Cuban funds and propaganda in their possession were found in Cochabamba, Bolivia, staying at the home of a pro-Communist newspaper editor. The Cuban Embassy in La Paz has reportedly offered to pay monthly rent for a meeting place for a newly formed Bolivian youth group.

There are also tentative indications that the Cuban Embassy in Bolivia may be preparing to support and guide certain extremist political factions with a view to influencing the presidential elections in Bolivia scheduled for next year. So far this year, at least 37 Bolivians are known to have traveled to Cuba, 18 of them for the 26 July celebrations.

Brazil

The appointment of Raul Roa Kouri, son of Cuba's foreign minister, to be ambassador in Rio de Janeiro is clear evidence of the importance Cuba attaches to Brazil in its over-

all hemispheric planning. Roa proved an able and popular diplomat at his previous assignment in Prague and is reliably reported to have been Fidel Castro's personal choice for the Rio post.

The first six months of this year have been characterized by a struggle among several Brazilian Communist and pro-Communist groups to win Cuban support. Chief among them are the orthodox Communist party headed by Luiz Carlos Prestes, that portion of the Peasant Leagues of northeast Brazil still led by Francisco Juliao, and the relatively small dissident Communist party which is ideologically allied with Communist China. During 1962 Castro had shown his sympathy for Juliao and the dissident Communists, both of which favor the violent revolutionary approach to power, and had provided each with support. The support for Juliao's Peasant Leagues ended abruptly last December, however, after the eruption of dissension within the movement and the discovery of several training centers by the Brazilian authorities.

In late February, Juliao and Prestes both traveled to Havana for talks with the Cuban leaders, and Prestes stopped off for talks in Moscow both on his way and his return from Cuba. On their return from Cuba, both Juliao and Prestes claimed to have won Castro's support--Prestes for a "peaceful" approach and Juliao for continued violence. Cuban support

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for Juliao has apparently been resumed although possibly on a reduced scale.

The Castro regime has expended considerable effort and funds on activities designed to impress Brazilians with the achievements of Cuba under Castro. Cuban support goes regularly into various Cuban-Brazilian friendship and cultural societies established in most major Brazilian cities and such nationwide organizations as the Society of Friends of Cuba and the National Committee Against Intervention in Cuba. At least 27 Brazilians went to Cuba for the 26 July celebrations.

British Guiana

The government of Premier Cheddi Jagan in British Guiana is openly pro-Castro. During the recent general strike, Jagan's regime requested and received shipments of fuel and food from Cuba and the Soviet Union. These have served to increase both the government's control over the economy and its reliance on bloc supplies.

Although trade now is returning to normal patterns, the ships, both Cuban and Soviet, carrying various items to British Guiana and Guianese rice to Cuba provide a means for the clandestine travel of subversives. Guianese students and party organizers have used them to go to Cuba, most recently on 20 July.

While there have been numerous reports that arms are being brought into British Guiana both for local use and for transshipment to Venezuela, these reports have not been confirmed. However, empty canisters, of a type normally used for the transportation of rifles, were reportedly found hidden under bags of cement which had been shipped from Cuba to Guiana during the strike. Also, on 14 May the police found a US-made machine gun with almost 1,000 rounds of ammunition concealed under the house of an organizer for Jagan's political party. At least 35 Guianese students have been in Cuba this year, and four of the five men arrested in Guiana in connection with a bombing attempt during the strike are members of the youth branch of Jagan's political party who had been in Cuba.

A Cuban tanker disembarked 18 Cuban air technicians in British Guiana on 16 July. Four of them, including three pilots, are still there and may be employed in Guiana's civil airline. In addition, Guiana Import-Export Corporation, the government's trading agency, recently loaned the regime a sum of \$1 million which had been obtained from Cuba, allegedly as advance payment for Cuban goods.

Chile

Chile is the only Latin American country where there is any possibility of a Communist-dominated political group

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winning in legal elections in the foreseeable future. There the Cuban effort is concentrating on support for the presidential campaign of Socialist leader Salvador Allende, the candidate of the Communist-dominated Popular Action Front (FRAP).

In June it was reliably reported that the Cuban news agency in Chile has supplied funds for office rent and other expenses for a group of far-leftist economists who are working for Allende's election. Allende himself has visited Castro several times, and his campaign manager was in Cuba as recently as last March. The latter's trip to Cuba was paid for by the Cuban commercial office in Chile.

Popular disillusionment in Chile with the Castro government, however, has led the FRAP to avoid references to Cuba in its present campaign, since it believes this would cost votes. At least 21 Chileans traveled to Cuba for the 26 July celebrations, including Luis Corvalan, secretary general of the Chilean Communist Party.

Colombia

In Colombia the United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR), a pro-Castro revolutionary organization, and the pro-Communist Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC), a terrorist organization, have been reported to be recipients of Cuban financial assistance--most recently

in April of this year. The report that a Colombian subversive is drawing up an extensive report on conditions in the country suggests that Cuban efforts there may become more extensive. Thus far this year, at least 130 Colombians have traveled to Cuba, 27 of them for the 26 July celebrations.

Costa Rica

The Popular Vanguard Party, Costa Rica's Communist party, continues to maintain a pro-Castro position and to send some of its members to Cuba for subversive training in Cuba. In February, 21 Costa Ricans returned from Cuba where they had received four to six months training as instructors in guerrilla warfare. Since their return, preparations have been made to set up training camps in Costa Rica with Cuban financial support. These preparations appear to be directed more toward support of the subversive effort in neighboring countries than against the government of Costa Rica. At least 12 more Costa Ricans went to Cuba for the 26 July celebrations.

Dominican Republic

Since February, a number of Dominican Communist and pro-Castro leaders have returned to the country from exile. Some are known to have received training in Cuba. One recent returnee is supposed to have brought \$30,000 in Cuban funds

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for use by the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), a pro-Castro, Communist-dominated party.

At least 20 Dominicans traveled to Cuba for the 26 July celebrations. Others, who had lived in Cuba for some time, may return soon. On 29 July, a Havana radiobroadcast was heard urging all Dominicans in Cuba desiring to return to their country to attend a meeting that was to be held later that day under the sponsorship of the "Committee for the Return to Santo Domingo of Dominican Residents."

Ecuador

Prior to the recent military coup, Ecuador was one of the Latin American countries where Cuban-supported subversion appeared to be reaching a point of possible overt guerrilla action. Ecuadoreans who had received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba last year had returned home and were reported on the point of beginning action.

In late March, Aquiles Valencia, a member of the central committee of the Ecuadorean Communist Party, returned to Ecuador from Chile reportedly bringing with him between \$30,000 and \$50,000. These funds allegedly were supplied by the Cuban Embassy in Santiago for use in supporting the guerrilla effort. An additional \$15,000 is reliably reported to have been promised the Ecuadorean Communists by Cuba.

Beginning in May, the Ecuadorean Government made several arrests of Communists returning to Ecuador from Europe, the Sino-Soviet bloc, and Cuba. These persons were found to be carrying sizable amounts of US currency, propaganda material, and various incriminating papers. The arrest of one of them, Jose Maria Roura, a member of the central committee of the Ecuadorean Communist Party, touched off a bitter internal struggle within the party resulting in a split and his expulsion. These divisions and the loss of funds intended to finance guerrilla activity forced the extreme left to postpone its plans to launch guerrilla action.

The military junta has, since the 11 July coup, taken a very strong stand against Castro-Communists and has arrested several key leaders; others have gone into hiding.

El Salvador

There has been little evidence of direct Cuban-supported subversion in El Salvador during the past six months. Seventeen Salvadorans are known to have gone to Cuba since January of this year. Four Salvadorans who went to Cuba in late April for the May Day celebrations were arrested on their return to El Salvador via the Grand Cayman air route and are still being held. Four more went for the 26 July celebrations.

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**SECRET**Guatemala

There is strong evidence that Guatemalan Communists have been receiving material support and guidance from Cuba. Meanwhile, pro-Communist former Guatemalan President Arbenz remains in exile in Cuba. The strong antisubversive measures by the Peralta government have apparently been an important setback to the subversive efforts.

Castro, in his 26 July address, singled out the "heroic Guatemalan fighters" along with the Venezuelan guerrillas as the only groups of Latin American revolutionaries to whom he sent messages of "solidarity and fraternity." Castro declared that the "revolution" in Guatemala, as in Venezuela, has reached the point where it has become irreversible.

Haiti

There has been no indication during the past six months of direct Cuban-sponsored subversive efforts in Haiti. Havana continues its Creole-language broadcasts to Haiti, however, and a broadcast in May urged Haitian Communists to "follow the example of their Venezuelan comrades and take an active role in the struggle against the government." They were urged to oppose any form of foreign intervention in Haiti.

Honduras

Pro-Castro activities in Honduras appear directed largely toward support of Communist efforts in neighboring Nicaragua and Guatemala. The government's attitude, the country's rugged terrain, the absence of an effective internal security force, and the presence of long-established routes for smuggling arms into neighboring countries make Honduras well suited for such a role.

Mexico

The Castro regime has made every effort to avoid antagonizing the Mexican Government in view of the importance to Cuba of maintaining its embassy there and its civil air connections through Mexico. On 29 July, two of the Mexican Communist Party's three top leaders traveled to Cuba by CUBANA flight from Mexico.

Nicaragua

The Cuban-supported Nicaraguan revolutionary group, the National Liberation Front (FLN), is directed by a group of Nicaraguan Communists resident in Cuba. Help from Cuba has been in the form of training, financial assistance, and guidance. A veteran member of the Nicaraguan Communist Party said in May that the party now receives funds and instructions from Cuba rather than from Moscow, via Mexico, as in the past.

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The FLN is active in neighboring Honduras and Costa Rica as well as in Nicaragua, and Cuba-trained men are reliably reported to be conducting guerrilla training programs. FLN activities in general appeared to be on the upswing during the past three months and were highlighted by the robbery of about \$7,000 from the Bank of America branch in Managua on 31 May.

Panama

The pro-Castro revolutionary group, Vanguard of National Action (VAN), has received both material support and guidance from Cuba. During the past six months some of the more than 100 Panamanians who had earlier received training in Cuba have established rudimentary training facilities in Panama. In addition, VAN members have apparently had some success in their efforts to accumulate arms and equipment.

Some of the Panamanians trained in Cuba were instructed to take every advantage of the opportunities afforded by next year's election campaigning. They were told to undertake campaign trips throughout Panama, to prepare reports on banks and bank employees, and to obtain information on payrolls and paymasters of Panamanian Government agencies.

[redacted] Fidel Castro had ordered that sabotage, terrorism, and attacks on Cuban exiles in Panama begin without delay.

At least 18 Panamanians traveled to Cuba for the 26 July celebrations. Among them were two leaders of the Communists' Peoples Party of Panama.

Paraguay

Paraguayan exiles continue to travel to Cuba and some of these receive training in subversion. At least three came for the 26 July celebrations.

Cuban influence is pronounced in some of the Paraguayan exile groups active in Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina. In April, Havana Radio announced that Paraguayan residents of Cuba had formed an association "to publicize the struggle of the Paraguayan people against the Stroessner dictatorship and to inform the oppressed Paraguayan people about the achievements of the Cuban revolution."

Peru

Cuba's major effort to foment revolution in Peru apparently is being done through the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and the Revolutionary Labor Party (POR). This is evident in the clandestine return of MIR and POR trainees from Cuba. While some of these trainees were apprehended by the Peruvian and Bolivian authorities as they entered the country, it is probable that others succeeded in returning. The MIR, at latest report, intends to begin guerrilla activity this month.

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**SECRET**Uruguay

Uruguay's importance to the Cuban subversive effort in Latin America lies in its value as a place where Cubans and Cuban agents are relatively free to carry on subversive contacts with dissidents from neighboring countries, particularly Argentines and Paraguayans. The Cuban Embassy in Montevideo has been the focal point of this activity. During the past six months, Uruguay has also been useful to Cuba as a distribution point for Cuban propaganda. Several thousand copies of Cuba, printed in Uruguay by a local publisher and paid for by the Cuban Embassy, are reportedly distributed fairly regularly. At least 15 Uruguayans traveled to Cuba for the 26 July celebrations.

Venezuela

The Betancourt administration continues to be Castro's primary target in Latin America. The Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN), a pro-Communist paramilitary group, continues to receive Cuban propa-

ganda support. The FALN reportedly also has radio connections with Cuba; the fact that the Cuban radio transmits news of FALN exploits very quickly after they occur would tend to substantiate this report.

The FALN does not appear to be receiving any substantial material or financial assistance from Cuba at this time. It now is meeting these needs through its own activities. Sabotage and guerrilla activities by the FALN were stepped up during June and continue at a high level. At least 65 Venezuelans have traveled to Cuba already this year, 12 of them for the 26 July celebrations.

Anti-Castro feeling among the general public in Venezuela is presently high and the terrorist activities of Castro supporters have probably considerably damaged Castro's image. Also, the government of Venezuela has taken increasingly energetic measures in an effort to counter Communist insurgency. Special emphasis is being placed on the improvement of the Venezuelan law enforcement and security agencies. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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